Colorado LegiSource

An informational and educational resource for the Colorado General Assembly by the Office of Legislative Legal Services.

Month: December 2018

  • Just Outside Our Doors – A Tribute to Colorado’s Pioneers and Pioneer Spirit

    by Patti Dahlberg

    At the corner of Colfax and Broadway stands the Pioneer Monument, a triangular fountain (except when the water is turned off during the winter or water rationing) paying tribute to those who crossed the Great Plains from the Missouri River to Denver along the Smoky Hill Trail. The trail, although more dangerous than other prairie trails, became the principal route for prospectors seeking fortune during the Colorado Gold Rush of 1859.

    The monument sits at the end of the Smoky Hill Trail. Designed by Frederick MacMonnies, it was dedicated in 1911 along with Civic Center Park. At its apex is a bronze figure of Kit Carson on a horse and around the rim of the fountain are three additional bronze figures – the hunter, the prospector, and the pioneer mother. The artist’s original design called for a Sioux warrior at the top of the fountain, but there was such an uproar about it that the artist switched the apex figure to the famous scout. The State Historical Society of Colorado added the plaque memorializing the Smoky Hill Trail in 1936.

    History of the Smoky Hill Trail

    As news of the gold found along the Cherry Creek quickly spread, would-be prospectors began traversing the country to seek their fortunes. There was, however, no official route connecting the East to Denver. The westernmost traveling point at that time was one of the jumping off points for the Oregon Trail in Salina (about 175 miles southwest of Leavenworth, Kansas). Prior to the Colorado gold rush, those traveling west would turn North or South to their destination in order to avoid the high peaks of the Rocky Mountains. To shorten the route from Kansas towns to Denver, frontiersmen began using an old Native American buffalo hunting trail along the Smoky Hill River.

    In 1859, an editorial in the Rocky Mountain News condemned the men and newspapers in the East encouraging people, in their rush for gold, to start out on the Smoky Hill Trail with inadequate provisions and the expectation of a good road and good camps with plenty of wood and water. Instead, there was no road, very little wood and, in many places, no water.

    Not deterred by the lack of food, scarce water supplies, frigid temperatures, and attacks by local tribes, thousands of prospectors, homesteaders, and soldiers traveled the Smoky Hill Trail between 1859 and 1865. Pioneers traveled in covered wagons or on foot pushing carts and wheelbarrows with many, especially that first year, barely surviving the trek. In Colorado, the largely unmarked trail separated into North and South paths, both ending in Denver. At one point there was a third path, called the “Middle Smoky Hill” which later became known as the “Starvation Trail” when the members of the Blue party were forced to resort to cannibalism to survive. Once the lone survivor (only because he was saved by the Arapaho) made his way to Denver with his tale, travel on the trail stopped while it was surveyed and more clearly marked to show the location of the trail and the best route for water.

    A couple of stage lines started up and failed before the Butterfield Overland Dispatch[1] was able to establish stagecoach transportation in 1865. The Dispatch built relay stations about every 12 miles along the 592-mile long route. Forts were built and soldiers posted along the stage route to protect the stations and travelers. By 1870, the Kansas Pacific Railroad pushed toward Denver, eliminating the need for stagecoaches.

    During the trail’s days of popularity, a number of famous and colorful characters traveled its path, including Generals Custer and Sheridan, Wild Bill Hickock, Wyatt Earp, John Wesley Hardin, and Buffalo Bill Cody. The trail also saw its share of bloodshed and death. Today, the old trail has several markers, old forts, and museums along its route from Kansas to Denver, ending in the Pioneer Monument in Denver.

     

    Sources:

    https://www.legendsofamerica.com/ks-smokyhillstrail/

    https://www.theclio.com/web/entry?id=23736

    https://www.hmdb.org/marker.asp?marker=4678

    http://www.waymarking.com/waymarks/WM8JH7_The_Pioneer_Monument_Denver_CO

    http://www.keystonegallery.com/area/history/bod.html

     

    [1] The word “Dispatch” is spelled “Despatch” on the plaque.

  • A Holiday Message

     

     Happy Holidays from the OLLS!

     

  • Got Bill Requests? Next Step is the “Bill Order”

    According to Joint Rule 24 (b)(1)(A), every legislator is allowed to submit five bill requests each session. These five bill requests are in addition to any appropriation, committee-approved, or sunset bills that a legislator may choose to carry and must be submitted by the bill request deadlines. But in order to keep these five bill requests, a legislator’s bill requests must also meet specific bill filing deadlines.

    Filing bills and introduction deadlines.

    Bill requests may be forfeited if the request does not meet specific filing deadlines.*  Prior to the start of each session, a legislator must decide which of his or her bill requests will be his or her “prefile” bill (to be filed and ready for introduction on the first day of session).  And, of course, which two bill requests will meet the other early bill introduction deadline. At some point at the start of session, a legislator must also decide which two bills will meet the regular bill deadlines.
    The filing deadline for prefile bills is normally five days prior to the start of session. This year, however, the prefile deadline is Friday, December 28, 2018. Each legislator must have one bill delivered to the front desk of the House or the Senate by this date or consider one of his or her bill requests as forfeited.*

    The House and Senate early and regular deadlines for filing bills for introduction vary by chamber:

    Bill Orders

    A legislator’s “bill order” is the order in which his or her bills are filed for introduction. Joint Rule 23 (a) says that a legislator should choose his or her prefile bill and two early bills from the three requests made by the early bill request deadlines. This year the early request deadlines were Monday, November 26, 2018, for returning General Assembly members and Monday, December 10, 2018, for those members newly elected this year. The rule also allows a legislator to choose a bill request submitted after this early request deadline to meet the early bill introduction deadlines if needed.

    A legislator’s early bill requests usually are filed as his or her early bills because these requests are submitted earlier and, therefore, are more likely to be further along in the drafting process than a bill request submitted later. But sometimes an early bill request may be more complicated than expected. In this case, the legislator may choose a relatively simple “regular” bill request (i.e., a request submitted after the early deadlines in November and December) to be one of his or her bills filed with the House or Senate in time to meet an “early” bill filing deadline, leaving the legislator with more time to work on the more complicated bill request.

    The Office of Legislative Legal Services (OLLS) encourages legislators to designate their prefile bill and other early bills (i.e., the bill order) as soon as possible in early December so that the OLLS can prioritize the drafting on these bills accordingly. If the OLLS does not have a legislator’s bill order on record, we will contact the legislator for this information and will continue contacting the legislator until the information is received.

    *  A legislator can ask for permission from the House or Senate Committee on Delayed Bills, whichever is appropriate, to submit additional bill requests or to waive a bill deadline to a different date.

  • Colorado Supreme Court Upholds New Sentences for Juvenile Offenders Serving Unconstitutional Mandatory Life Sentences Without the Possibility of Parole

    by Michael Dohr

    The Colorado Supreme Court recently had to decide whether Senate Bill 16-181, concerning the sentencing of persons convicted of class 1 felonies committed while the persons were juveniles, was unconstitutional because it violated the special legislation clause, Article 5, section 25 of the Colorado constitution. S.B. 16-181 is related to juvenile sentences that were determined to be unconstitutional based on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions.

    BACKGROUND

    In Colorado from July 1, 1990, to July 1, 2006, a juvenile convicted of a class 1 felony in a district court was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a mandatory LWOP sentence for a juvenile violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Then, in 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that its decision applied retroactively. Together, these decisions invalidated the Colorado LWOP sentences for approximately 50 individuals.

    That created a problem for the Colorado courts that had to resentence those individuals, because there was no statutory guidance for what type of sentence could be imposed. Ultimately, the Colorado Supreme Court was forced to decide: What sentence range would the legislature have adopted if it knew an LWOP sentence was unconstitutional? In People v. Tate, the Colorado Supreme Court implored the legislature to address the issue. In 2016, the General Assembly did so by passing S.B. 16-181.

    S.B. 16-181 essentially creates two different sentencing ranges for those individuals serving the unconstitutional LWOP sentences. For those serving a sentence for a conviction of felony murder[1], the range is 30 to 50 years and for those serving a sentence for a conviction of another class 1 felony it is a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 40 years.

    Curtis Brooks was sentenced in 1997 to an LWOP sentence after being convicted of felony murder. Brooks sought resentencing of his unconstitutional sentence under the new sentencing scheme created in S.B. 16-181, asking the court to sentence him within the 30-to- 50-year range. The prosecution objected arguing the 30-to-50-year range violated the constitutional prohibition on special legislation. Originally, the district court agreed with the prosecution that the provision was unconstitutional, but then reversed itself on reconsideration. Before resentencing occurred, the prosecution appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court on the special legislation question.

    ANALYSIS

    The prosecution premised its claim on the fact that the sentencing provision had two different provisions, one for those who committed felony murder and one for those who committed any other class 1 felony. They argued that the felony murder sentencing provision was special legislation because it created a special class apart from everyone else subject to an unconstitutional LWOP sentence.

    The special legislation clause was enacted, in part, to prevent legislation that applies to some classes but not others without a reasonable basis for distinguishing them. It was also intended to curb favoritism on the part of the General Assembly, prevent the state government from interfering with local affairs, and preclude the legislature from passing unnecessary laws to fit limited circumstances. To determine if a statute is special legislation, there is a two-part inquiry. First, is the classification adopted by the legislature a genuine class or is it logically and factually limited to a class of one and thus illusory? If the class is illusory, then it is prohibited special legislation. If not, then the question is whether the classification is reasonable.

    The Colorado Supreme Court considered whether the classification the legislature created for those convicted of felony murder was genuine or illusory. First, it was estimated that the class in this case currently applies to at least 16 of the approximately 50 persons who are serving the unconstitutional LWOP sentence. The Court found that the class being larger than one favored a finding that it was genuine. Second, the Court found that the class was not limited by time, also suggesting it was genuine. Although there are currently at least 16 individuals in the class, an individual in the future who is convicted of felony murder for a cold case committed between 1990 and 2006 would also be subject to the classification. So, it was possible the class could expand beyond 16. Finally, the court analyzed the legislation and found that the legislature did not tailor the legislation to accomplish a particular purpose. Instead, the legislature was responding to fill the gap left by the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination that an LWOP sentence is unconstitutional. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the classification was genuine.

    That led the Court to consider whether the classification was reasonable. To determine whether the classification is reasonable, a court must consider whether there is a reasonable relationship between the legislation’s legitimate stated purpose and the classification. The Court found it reasonable to treat those who committed felony murder different from those who committed a different class 1 felony in two contexts. The legislature’s plenary authority allows it to adopt more severe penalties for conduct with more grave conduct and vice versa, so the legislature reasonably decided to treat those convicted of felony murder differently from those convicted of a different class 1 felony. The court also found it was reasonable for the legislature to create a different sentencing scheme for those convicted between 1990 and 2006 rather than just applying the current scheme to those individuals since the gap was created by the U.S. Supreme Court decisions. It was reasonable to create a different scheme for those individuals, because the individuals had already served a decade or more in prison and thus were in a unique position compared to a person convicted today.

    With these findings, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the juvenile sentencing provision adopted in S.B. 16-181 against claims it is special legislation.

     

    [1] A person commits felony murder by committing or attempting to commit arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault, or escape and in the course or furtherance of the crime or while in immediate flight therefrom the death of another person is caused. §18-3-102, C.R.S.