Section 7. General assembly - shall meet when - term of members - committees.

The general assembly shall meet in regular session at 10 a.m. no later than the second Wednesday of January of each year. The general assembly shall meet at other times when convened in special session by the governor pursuant to section 9 of article IV of this constitution or by written request by two-thirds of the members of each house to the presiding officer of each house to consider only those subjects specified in such request. The term of service of the members of the general assembly shall begin on the convening of the first regular session of the general assembly next after their election. The committees of the general assembly, unless otherwise provided by the general assembly, shall expire on the convening of the first regular session after a general election. Regular sessions of the general assembly shall not exceed one hundred twenty calendar days.

Source: Entire article added, effective August 1, 1876, see **L. 1877,** p. 38. **L. 50:** Entire section amended, see **L. 51,** p. 554. **L. 74:** Entire section amended, p. 448, effective January 1, 1975. **L. 82:** Entire section amended, p. 683, effective upon proclamation of the Governor, **L. 83,** p. 1669, December 30, 1982. **L. 88:** Entire section amended, p. 1451, effective upon proclamation of the Governor, **L. 89,** p. 1655, January 3, 1989.

Editor's note: The Governor's proclamation date in 1974 was December 20, 1974.

ANNOTATIONS

Law reviews. For article, "The Desirability of Change in Colorado's Legislative Organization and Procedure", see 23 Dicta 119 (1946). For note, "Colorado's Ombudsman Office", see 45 Den. L.J. 93 (1969).

General assembly's joint rules 23(d) and 44(g) constitutionally comport with this section's limitation of the length of the regular session to "one hundred twenty calendar days." The general assembly's joint rules 23(d) and 44(g) operate together to count the maximum 120 days of regular legislative session permitted by this section consecutively unless the governor has declared a state of disaster emergency due to a public health emergency, in which case only working days on which at least one chamber convenes count against the 120-day limit. This section is ambiguous as to whether the 120 days must be counted consecutively, and the joint rules reasonably resolve the ambiguity. The joint rules also sensibly effectuate the dual purposes of the 120-day limit, assuring that the general assembly remains a part-time citizen legislature and that it has sufficient time in session to complete its work, by counting the 120 days consecutively unless a public health disaster interrupts that work and, in that rare circumstance only, by counting only working days. In re Interrogatory on HJR 20-1006, 2020 CO 23, __ P.3d __.

Revision and alteration of districts excepted from section. Where an amendment to a constitution is in conflict, or in any manner inconsistent, with a prior provision of the constitution, the amendment controls. Thus, section 48 of this article, providing for the mandatory revision and alteration of

legislative districts, creates an exception to the provisions of this section. In re Interrogatories Concerning House Joint Resolution No. 1008, 171 Colo. 200, 467 P.2d 56 (1970).

Consideration of reapportionment prior to adoption of section 48 of this article. As it was not mandatory by any law or constitutional provision that the governor designate reapportionment legislation as one of the subjects which the general assembly might consider in an even-numbered session, if he failed or refused to designate it, the general assembly could not even discuss the subject, and the constitutional mandate to reapportion was not mandatory until an odd-numbered session convened. In re Legislative Reapportionment, 150 Colo. 380, 374 P.2d 66 (1962).

Without independent enabling act. The general assembly could not constitutionally repeal the aid to needy disabled program under § 26-1-109 (9)(a), and institute an aid to temporarily disabled program, without an independent enabling act, since the governor had not included the subject in his call. Burciaga v. Shea, 187 Colo. 78, 530 P.2d 508 (1974).