Colorado LegiSource

An informational and educational resource for the Colorado General Assembly by the Office of Legislative Legal Services.

Month: January 2024

  • Looking Back to Move Forward: The Colorado Supreme Court Explains the State Constitution’s Retrospectivity Clause.

    by Conrad Imel

    Often the General Assembly passes bills to regulate future conduct, but sometimes a legislator wants to expressly address something that happened in the past. The Colorado Constitution limits the General Assembly’s power to enact legislation that applies retroactively, so we at LegiSource are here to help make sense of these limits on the General Assembly’s authority.

    The General Assembly has broad plenary authority to enact legislation, but that power is limited by state and federal constitutional provisions. One such provision is the Colorado Constitution’s retrospectivity clause. Article II, section 11 of the Colorado Constitution states:

    No ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges, franchises or immunities, shall be passed by the general assembly. (emphasis added)

    Recently, in Aurora Public Schools v. A.S., the Colorado Supreme Court had occasion to outline the contours of this retrospectivity clause. Aurora Public Schools involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Senate Bill 21-088. That bill created a new statutory cause of action for victims of sexual misconduct that occurred while the victim was a minor. Like most laws, S.B. 21-088 applies prospectively, to conduct that occurs after the bill’s effective date. However, S.B. 21-088 also expressly applies retroactively. The bill created a three-year “look back” window for victims of misconduct that occurred between January 1, 1960, and January 1, 2022 (the bill’s effective date). The look-back provision allowed victims of past misconduct to bring a claim during the three-year period between January 1, 2022, and January 1, 2025. The plaintiffs in Aurora Public Schools brought a claim pursuant to the look-back provision; the defendants moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the look-back window was unconstitutionally retrospective.

    The Court in Aurora Public Schools began by explaining the retrospectivity clause and reaffirming its prior retrospectivity jurisprudence. The Court explained that the purpose of the retrospectivity clause is to prevent unfairness that would otherwise result from “changing the consequences of an act after that act has occurred. [. . .] In other words, the prohibition on retrospective legislation prevents the legislature from changing the rules after the fact because to do so would be unjust.”

    But not all retroactive legislation is unconstitutionally retrospective. To determine whether a retroactive law is unconstitutionally retrospective, Colorado courts use the “Story test,”[1]  which says that a law violates article II, section 11’s prohibition if it (1) impairs a vested right; or (2) creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past.  While these two prongs arguably overlap, a law that satisfies either prong is unconstitutionally retrospective. The focus of the test is on substantive laws. Laws that are merely procedural or remedial may apply retroactively without offending the constitution.

    The plaintiffs in Aurora Public Schools argued that there is a public policy exception to the prohibition on retrospective legislation, but the Court disagreed, holding that there is no public policy exception to the retrospectivity clause.

    Ultimately, the Court held that S.B. 21-088’s look-back window is unconstitutional in violation of the retrospectivity clause to the extent that it permits a victim to bring a claim for past sexual misconduct for which previously available causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations. The court found that the bill created a new right for relief for the plaintiffs, which in turn created a new obligation and disability with respect to past transactions for the defendants, in violation of the retrospectivity clause. Further, the court affirmed past precedent that the retrospectivity clause prohibits reviving claims that are time-barred by the statute of limitations and found that the three-year look-back window to bring a new cause of action for past conduct indirectly accomplishes the same ends as reviving a claim that is time-barred.

    So what does the Court’s opinion in Aurora Public Schools mean for the General Assembly? First, the Court made clear that Colorado courts will use the “Story test” to determine the constitutionality of a law that applies retroactively and that there is no public policy exception to the retrospectivity clause. Second, the Court explained that the retrospectivity clause prohibits the legislature from doing something indirectly which it could not do directly, so the retrospectivity analysis applies to any law that applies retroactively.

    The constitution does not completely prohibit the General Assembly from enacting laws that apply to conduct that occurred prior to the law going into effect, but it does prohibit laws that impair a vested right or create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability to past conduct. If a member wants to sponsor a bill that applies retroactively, the bill drafter can help walk the sponsor through any constitutional concerns.

    To read more about the Colorado constitution’s ex post facto clause (i.e., section 11 of article II), see https://legisource.net/2014/09/25/ex-post-facto-laws-effective-dates-and-legislative-time-travel/ .

    [1] The “Story test” is named for United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, who first articulated the test in Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F.Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814).

  • Canons of Statutory Construction

    by Jessica Herrera

    Is the drafter in the room? We have a statutory interpretation question about a series of words.

    In a perfect world, all statutes would have a plain and straightforward meaning. Unfortunately, there are times when there is ambiguity in the words or phrases of a statute, and courts will rely on various methods of statutory interpretation. One way courts discern what a statute means is by using canons of statutory construction. These canons of statutory construction are interpretive principles that drafters in the Office of Legislative Legal Services often consider when drafting bills. Although these canons of statutory construction are not absolute, and may at times even conflict with one another, they are nevertheless a tool in your favorite drafter’s tool box.

    Canons of Statutory Constructions Regarding a List or Series of Words

    Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius

    Starting off with the most common sense canon of statutory construction, the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes from the Latin phrase that means “the express mention of one person or thing excludes others.” This canon boils down to the presumption that specified enumerations in a statute restrict the meaning to just those expressly listed. To illustrate, a statute that prohibits an individual from intentionally “hitting, kicking, or stomping” on a dog would exclude the prohibition of other harmful acts, such as strangling a dog, even if the legislative intent is obviously to prevent actions of a similar nature. Would adding a broader, catch-all clause at the end help prevent other harmful acts to dogs? It depends. The next canon of statutory construction sheds some light on having a catch-all clause at the end of a sentence.

    Ejusdem Generis

    Ejusdem Generis is a canon of statutory construction that comes from the Latin phrase that means “of the same kind.” Ejusdem Generis is the doctrine that states where there is a list or a series that specifies a number of specific people or things, and the list is immediately followed by more general words or a phrase, the general words or phrase is construed as being limited in scope and applies only to people or things of the same kind or class as those expressly mentioned with particularity. For example, if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles, and other motor-power vehicles, a court applying the principle of ejusdem generis to the general phase of “motor-power vehicles” would likely exclude a boat or airplane because the specified list was limited to land-based vehicles.[1] In essence, it is worthwhile to pay attention to a common theme in an enumerated list, as a court may limit the scope of a catch-all phrase to a specific characteristic. See more about Ejusdem Generis here.

    The Last Antecedent Rule and the Series Qualifier Battle

    As we all recall from primary school, an antecedent is a word that is replaced by another word in the course of a sentence. The most common occurrence is when an antecedent is replaced by a pronoun. For example in the sentence, “Rose is very smart, she would make a great public official!” “Rose” is the antecedent to the pronoun “she.” Now that we all remember what an antecedent is, let’s extrapolate the concept of an antecedent to the canon of statutory construction known as the last antecedent.

    Under the last antecedent rule, when a series is followed by words of limitation, the limitation will apply only to the last antecedent on the list. For instance, a statute may provide, “Licensees may hunt deer, moose, and fish that are not on the endangered species list.” The restriction “that are not on the endangered species list” will apply only to fish, which is the last antecedent on the list. The last anteceding rule applies to qualifiers that follow a list.

    If a qualifier precedes a list, the series qualifier cannon applies. For instance, a statute may provide “Licenses may hunt blue deer, moose, and fish.” Under the series qualifier canon, the qualifier blue applies to fish as well as to deer and moose.

    If the last antecedent rule appears familiar to you, that may be due to your diligent reading on construction of statutes found in part 2 of article 4 of title 2, C.R.S. Specifically, section 2-4-214,C.R.S., states that the last antecedent rule has not been adopted by the general assembly. That means the modifier is not presumed to apply to just the last item on the list. Although the last antecedent rule may have had its last hurrah in Colorado, it is still used in other states and notably in the recent United States Supreme Court case Lockhart v. United States. [2]

    The court in Lockhart interpreted the federal law that set forth a mandatory minimum sentencing for an individual who violated federal law regarding possession of child pornography and also had a prior conviction under “…the laws of any state relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward…” The question at issue in Lockhart was whether the qualifier “involving a minor or ward” applied only to the last antecedent, “abusive sexual conduct,” or whether it also applied to the whole series and thus included both “aggravated sexual abuse” and “sexual abuse.” If the qualifier “involving a minor or ward” applied to the entire series, the defendant’s prior conviction of sexual abuse did not subject him to federal statute’s mandatory minimum sentencing because the victim was not a minor or ward. The Supreme Court held that the qualifier applied only to the last antecedent and not the whole series, and thus Lockhart’s prior conviction of sexual abuse perpetrated upon an adult elevated his minimum sentencing.

    These canons of statutory construction can play a role in determining whether something on a list or series is included or excluded and used as a tool to decipher the legislature’s intent. Sometimes making a list or series in statute is not as straightforward as one would think. Given the potential ambiguity and unintended legislative intent that may be implied from a series with a modifier, it might be best to forgo including a modifier all together and instead opt to flesh out each item on a list independently as suggested here.

    [1] McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931)

    [2] Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347 (2016)