Author: olls

  • The Office of Legislative Legal Services: More Than Just Bill and Amendment Drafting

    by Sharon Eubanks

    With the 2019 legislative session under way, legislators have already been interacting with the staff of the Office of Legislative Legal Services for their bill and amendment requests.  But the Legislative Legal Services staff, comprised of attorneys and other professional staff, provides a variety of written materials and services to legislators in addition to their bill and amendment drafting needs.  We encourage legislators to learn more about and make full use of the products and services we can provide.  Please visit our web page at https://leg.colorado.gov/agencies/office-of-legislative-legal-services.

    Legislative Legal Services is the General Assembly’s nonpartisan legal staff agency. As legislative lawyers, we maintain an attorney-client relationship with the General Assembly, as an institution, and not with each legislator. Therefore, we are obligated to serve the best interests of the institutional client, the General Assembly, as distinguished from the individual interests of any legislator. However, when working individually with legislators, we are statutorily bound to maintain the confidentiality of all bill and amendment requests before introduction, and we are ethically bound to maintain the confidentiality of the communications we have with each legislator, as a constituent of the institution.

    In addition to our primary function of drafting bills, resolutions, and amendments, the Legislative Legal Services staff, upon request, can provide legislators with written materials to help them understand Colorado law and what other states are doing to address various issues and to help them explain their bills. Due to time constraints created by bill and amendment drafting demands, which are our first priority during the legislative session, our staff may not always be able to respond immediately to every legislator’s request. But we do our best to provide the requested materials as soon as practicable, time permitting, and on a first-come, first-served basis. Examples of ancillary materials available upon request include:

    • More-detailed, written explanations of bills;
    • Summaries of changes made to a bill in committee, in the first house, or in the second house;
    • Tables comparing bill provisions;
    • Explanations of state or federal statutes;
    • Summaries of case law relevant to a bill;
    • Summaries of case law interpreting a particular statute or issue;
    • Legislative histories of issues or bills;
    • Legislative histories of constitutional or statutory provisions;
    • Comparisons of Colorado law with the law of other states on particular issues; and
    • Lists of all Colorado statutes addressing an issue.

    Our office also provides written legal opinions, including written legal opinions on issues relating to pending legislation. We hold legal opinion requests in strictest confidence. We will not release a written memorandum to other persons without the permission of the legislator who requested it. And we will give the same answer if another legislator asks us the same question, which will result in identical legal opinions for different legislators.

    There are some limitations on the materials and services we can provide to legislators due to our role as nonpartisan legislative staff. Examples of the documents and tasks that Legislative Legal Services staff cannot provide include:

    • Voting records on an issue or bill;
    • Talking points advocating for or opposing a policy position;
    • Conveying messages that encourage a legislator to vote for a bill or discourage a legislator from voting for a bill;
    • Soliciting legislators as joint prime sponsors, cosponsors, or second house sponsors;
    • Violating confidentiality, e.g., telling a legislator about amendments prepared for other legislators to his or her bill, telling a legislator what another legislator said or told others about the legislator’s bill, or telling a legislator what legal advice our office gave another legislator;
    • Assisting a legislator in counting votes; and
    • Advocating for passage or defeat of legislation on policy or any other grounds.

    These lists illustrate the materials or services we can and cannot provide, but they are not exhaustive. If a legislator has a request for materials or assistance, please ask us. If it’s something we can provide, we will do so.

    The Legislative Legal Services staff is ready to provide the services and support to help the members of the Seventy-second General Assembly have a productive and successful legislative session in 2019. We encourage legislators to utilize the Legislative Legal Services staff for all their legislative needs, not just for bill and amendment drafting.

  • Does Colorado Have a “Stand Your Ground” Law?

    by Richard Sweetman

    [Editor’s note: We originally posted this article on October 3, 2013. Since that time, the Florida law has been amended. This reposting is an update to the original article.]

    No, Colorado does not have a “Stand Your Ground” law. We have a “Make My Day” law.

    Wait; I’m serious. Let me explain.

    “Stand Your Ground” Laws

    A “Stand Your Ground” law is similar to a standard self-defense statute, in that it allows a person to use deadly force in self-defense when the person has a reasonable belief that deadly force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm. However, a “Stand Your Ground” law expands upon the traditional self-defense doctrine in one or more ways. For example, a “Stand Your Ground” law may:

    • Identify locations where a person may use deadly force under certain conditions, including dwellings, vehicles, businesses, and other public places where the person is legally present;
    • State explicitly that a person has “no duty to retreat” before resorting to the use of deadly force in self-defense;
    • Establish a presumption of reasonableness in favor of a person who uses deadly force under certain conditions;
    • Establish civil immunity for a person who uses deadly force under certain conditions; or
    • Allow a person to use deadly force to stop the commission of certain felonies.

    Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law (Fla. Stat. 776.013), which has attracted much attention in the past, reads:

                (1) A person who is in a dwelling or residence in which the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and use or threaten to use: (. . .)

                (b) Deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.

    The Florida law also creates the following presumption:

                (2) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using or threatening to use defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if:

                (a) The person against whom the defensive force was used or threatened was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and

                (b) The person who uses or threatens to use defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred.

    This presumption eliminates the burden of proof for a person who used deadly force—that is, the burden to prove that he or she had a “reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm.” The presumption shifts the burden to the prosecution, who must prove otherwise.

    Florida adopted its “Stand Your Ground” law in 2005 and amended it in 2014 and 2017. Since then, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, the number of states with similar laws has grown to 22.

    Colorado’s “Make My Day” Law

    Colorado adopted its “Make My Day” law in 1985. At that time, the phrase “make my day” had been popularized by the 1983 Clint Eastwood film Sudden Impact and then revived by President Reagan in his 1985 threat to veto any tax increase legislation sent to him by the U.S. Congress. The law is codified at section 18-1-704.5, C.R.S.

    Colorado’s “Make My Day” law is similar to a “Stand Your Ground” law, in that both laws may be seen as expansions upon the old common law “castle doctrine.” Under this doctrine, a person has no “duty to retreat” before resorting to the use of deadly force when faced with imminent peril in his or her home. Compared to a “Stand Your Ground” law, however, Colorado’s “Make My Day” law is a relatively limited expansion.

    The very idea of a statutory “castle doctrine” in Colorado is a little strange because the castle doctrine, by its own terms, is an exception to another doctrine—the duty to retreat. And except in certain specific circumstances, there has never been a duty to retreat in Colorado. (See People v. Toler, 9 P.3d 341, 348 (Colo. 2000), citing Boykin v. People, 45 P. 419 (Colo. 1896).) It is therefore no surprise that Colorado’s “Make My Day” law does not mention a duty to retreat; it has never been necessary for the General Assembly to state explicitly that no such duty exists in Colorado.

    The “Make My Day” law is like the “castle doctrine” because it is limited to dwellings. Rather than stating that there is no duty to retreat in a dwelling, however, Colorado’s law lowers the standard for justifying the use of deadly force against an intruder in a dwelling.

    Under Colorado’s law, any occupant of a dwelling may use deadly force against an intruder when the occupant reasonably believes the intruder (1) has committed or intends to commit a crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry and (2) might use any physical force, no matter how slight, against any occupant of the dwelling. This is a lower standard of justification than appears, for example, in Colorado’s historical self-defense statute, which is codified at section 18-1-704, C.R.S.

    Colorado also has longstanding statutes justifying the use of physical force in special relationships (18-1-703, C.R.S.), in defense of premises (18-1-705, C.R.S.), and in defense of property (18-1-706, C.R.S.).

    Perfectly Clear?

    So do you now understand the difference between a “Stand Your Ground” law and Colorado’s “Make My Day” law? Not entirely? Well, that’s okay. Frankly, the distinctions are not entirely clear—partly because 22 variations of the “Stand Your Ground” law now exist. But the table below, which contrasts Florida’s law with Colorado’s law, can help you remember the key differences. For more information about “Stand Your Ground” laws, visit the NCSL website.

  • Just Outside Our Doors – A Tribute to Colorado’s Pioneers and Pioneer Spirit

    by Patti Dahlberg

    At the corner of Colfax and Broadway stands the Pioneer Monument, a triangular fountain (except when the water is turned off during the winter or water rationing) paying tribute to those who crossed the Great Plains from the Missouri River to Denver along the Smoky Hill Trail. The trail, although more dangerous than other prairie trails, became the principal route for prospectors seeking fortune during the Colorado Gold Rush of 1859.

    The monument sits at the end of the Smoky Hill Trail. Designed by Frederick MacMonnies, it was dedicated in 1911 along with Civic Center Park. At its apex is a bronze figure of Kit Carson on a horse and around the rim of the fountain are three additional bronze figures – the hunter, the prospector, and the pioneer mother. The artist’s original design called for a Sioux warrior at the top of the fountain, but there was such an uproar about it that the artist switched the apex figure to the famous scout. The State Historical Society of Colorado added the plaque memorializing the Smoky Hill Trail in 1936.

    History of the Smoky Hill Trail

    As news of the gold found along the Cherry Creek quickly spread, would-be prospectors began traversing the country to seek their fortunes. There was, however, no official route connecting the East to Denver. The westernmost traveling point at that time was one of the jumping off points for the Oregon Trail in Salina (about 175 miles southwest of Leavenworth, Kansas). Prior to the Colorado gold rush, those traveling west would turn North or South to their destination in order to avoid the high peaks of the Rocky Mountains. To shorten the route from Kansas towns to Denver, frontiersmen began using an old Native American buffalo hunting trail along the Smoky Hill River.

    In 1859, an editorial in the Rocky Mountain News condemned the men and newspapers in the East encouraging people, in their rush for gold, to start out on the Smoky Hill Trail with inadequate provisions and the expectation of a good road and good camps with plenty of wood and water. Instead, there was no road, very little wood and, in many places, no water.

    Not deterred by the lack of food, scarce water supplies, frigid temperatures, and attacks by local tribes, thousands of prospectors, homesteaders, and soldiers traveled the Smoky Hill Trail between 1859 and 1865. Pioneers traveled in covered wagons or on foot pushing carts and wheelbarrows with many, especially that first year, barely surviving the trek. In Colorado, the largely unmarked trail separated into North and South paths, both ending in Denver. At one point there was a third path, called the “Middle Smoky Hill” which later became known as the “Starvation Trail” when the members of the Blue party were forced to resort to cannibalism to survive. Once the lone survivor (only because he was saved by the Arapaho) made his way to Denver with his tale, travel on the trail stopped while it was surveyed and more clearly marked to show the location of the trail and the best route for water.

    A couple of stage lines started up and failed before the Butterfield Overland Dispatch[1] was able to establish stagecoach transportation in 1865. The Dispatch built relay stations about every 12 miles along the 592-mile long route. Forts were built and soldiers posted along the stage route to protect the stations and travelers. By 1870, the Kansas Pacific Railroad pushed toward Denver, eliminating the need for stagecoaches.

    During the trail’s days of popularity, a number of famous and colorful characters traveled its path, including Generals Custer and Sheridan, Wild Bill Hickock, Wyatt Earp, John Wesley Hardin, and Buffalo Bill Cody. The trail also saw its share of bloodshed and death. Today, the old trail has several markers, old forts, and museums along its route from Kansas to Denver, ending in the Pioneer Monument in Denver.

     

    Sources:

    https://www.legendsofamerica.com/ks-smokyhillstrail/

    https://www.theclio.com/web/entry?id=23736

    https://www.hmdb.org/marker.asp?marker=4678

    http://www.waymarking.com/waymarks/WM8JH7_The_Pioneer_Monument_Denver_CO

    http://www.keystonegallery.com/area/history/bod.html

     


    [1] The word “Dispatch” is spelled “Despatch” on the plaque.

  • A Holiday Message

     

     Happy Holidays from the OLLS!

     

  • Got Bill Requests? Next Step is the “Bill Order”

    According to Joint Rule 24 (b)(1)(A), every legislator is allowed to submit five bill requests each session. These five bill requests are in addition to any appropriation, committee-approved, or sunset bills that a legislator may choose to carry and must be submitted by the bill request deadlines. But in order to keep these five bill requests, a legislator’s bill requests must also meet specific bill filing deadlines.

    Filing bills and introduction deadlines.

    Bill requests may be forfeited if the request does not meet specific filing deadlines.*  Prior to the start of each session, a legislator must decide which of his or her bill requests will be his or her “prefile” bill (to be filed and ready for introduction on the first day of session).  And, of course, which two bill requests will meet the other early bill introduction deadline. At some point at the start of session, a legislator must also decide which two bills will meet the regular bill deadlines.
    The filing deadline for prefile bills is normally five days prior to the start of session. This year, however, the prefile deadline is Friday, December 28, 2018. Each legislator must have one bill delivered to the front desk of the House or the Senate by this date or consider one of his or her bill requests as forfeited.*

    The House and Senate early and regular deadlines for filing bills for introduction vary by chamber:

    Bill Orders

    A legislator’s “bill order” is the order in which his or her bills are filed for introduction. Joint Rule 23 (a) says that a legislator should choose his or her prefile bill and two early bills from the three requests made by the early bill request deadlines. This year the early request deadlines were Monday, November 26, 2018, for returning General Assembly members and Monday, December 10, 2018, for those members newly elected this year. The rule also allows a legislator to choose a bill request submitted after this early request deadline to meet the early bill introduction deadlines if needed.

    A legislator’s early bill requests usually are filed as his or her early bills because these requests are submitted earlier and, therefore, are more likely to be further along in the drafting process than a bill request submitted later. But sometimes an early bill request may be more complicated than expected. In this case, the legislator may choose a relatively simple “regular” bill request (i.e., a request submitted after the early deadlines in November and December) to be one of his or her bills filed with the House or Senate in time to meet an “early” bill filing deadline, leaving the legislator with more time to work on the more complicated bill request.

    The Office of Legislative Legal Services (OLLS) encourages legislators to designate their prefile bill and other early bills (i.e., the bill order) as soon as possible in early December so that the OLLS can prioritize the drafting on these bills accordingly. If the OLLS does not have a legislator’s bill order on record, we will contact the legislator for this information and will continue contacting the legislator until the information is received.

    *  A legislator can ask for permission from the House or Senate Committee on Delayed Bills, whichever is appropriate, to submit additional bill requests or to waive a bill deadline to a different date.

  • Colorado Supreme Court Upholds New Sentences for Juvenile Offenders Serving Unconstitutional Mandatory Life Sentences Without the Possibility of Parole

    by Michael Dohr

    The Colorado Supreme Court recently had to decide whether Senate Bill 16-181, concerning the sentencing of persons convicted of class 1 felonies committed while the persons were juveniles, was unconstitutional because it violated the special legislation clause, Article 5, section 25 of the Colorado constitution. S.B. 16-181 is related to juvenile sentences that were determined to be unconstitutional based on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions.

    BACKGROUND

    In Colorado from July 1, 1990, to July 1, 2006, a juvenile convicted of a class 1 felony in a district court was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a mandatory LWOP sentence for a juvenile violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Then, in 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that its decision applied retroactively. Together, these decisions invalidated the Colorado LWOP sentences for approximately 50 individuals.

    That created a problem for the Colorado courts that had to resentence those individuals, because there was no statutory guidance for what type of sentence could be imposed. Ultimately, the Colorado Supreme Court was forced to decide: What sentence range would the legislature have adopted if it knew an LWOP sentence was unconstitutional? In People v. Tate, the Colorado Supreme Court implored the legislature to address the issue. In 2016, the General Assembly did so by passing S.B. 16-181.

    S.B. 16-181 essentially creates two different sentencing ranges for those individuals serving the unconstitutional LWOP sentences. For those serving a sentence for a conviction of felony murder[1], the range is 30 to 50 years and for those serving a sentence for a conviction of another class 1 felony it is a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 40 years.

    Curtis Brooks was sentenced in 1997 to an LWOP sentence after being convicted of felony murder. Brooks sought resentencing of his unconstitutional sentence under the new sentencing scheme created in S.B. 16-181, asking the court to sentence him within the 30-to- 50-year range. The prosecution objected arguing the 30-to-50-year range violated the constitutional prohibition on special legislation. Originally, the district court agreed with the prosecution that the provision was unconstitutional, but then reversed itself on reconsideration. Before resentencing occurred, the prosecution appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court on the special legislation question.

    ANALYSIS

    The prosecution premised its claim on the fact that the sentencing provision had two different provisions, one for those who committed felony murder and one for those who committed any other class 1 felony. They argued that the felony murder sentencing provision was special legislation because it created a special class apart from everyone else subject to an unconstitutional LWOP sentence.

    The special legislation clause was enacted, in part, to prevent legislation that applies to some classes but not others without a reasonable basis for distinguishing them. It was also intended to curb favoritism on the part of the General Assembly, prevent the state government from interfering with local affairs, and preclude the legislature from passing unnecessary laws to fit limited circumstances. To determine if a statute is special legislation, there is a two-part inquiry. First, is the classification adopted by the legislature a genuine class or is it logically and factually limited to a class of one and thus illusory? If the class is illusory, then it is prohibited special legislation. If not, then the question is whether the classification is reasonable.

    The Colorado Supreme Court considered whether the classification the legislature created for those convicted of felony murder was genuine or illusory. First, it was estimated that the class in this case currently applies to at least 16 of the approximately 50 persons who are serving the unconstitutional LWOP sentence. The Court found that the class being larger than one favored a finding that it was genuine. Second, the Court found that the class was not limited by time, also suggesting it was genuine. Although there are currently at least 16 individuals in the class, an individual in the future who is convicted of felony murder for a cold case committed between 1990 and 2006 would also be subject to the classification. So, it was possible the class could expand beyond 16. Finally, the court analyzed the legislation and found that the legislature did not tailor the legislation to accomplish a particular purpose. Instead, the legislature was responding to fill the gap left by the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination that an LWOP sentence is unconstitutional. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the classification was genuine.

    That led the Court to consider whether the classification was reasonable. To determine whether the classification is reasonable, a court must consider whether there is a reasonable relationship between the legislation’s legitimate stated purpose and the classification. The Court found it reasonable to treat those who committed felony murder different from those who committed a different class 1 felony in two contexts. The legislature’s plenary authority allows it to adopt more severe penalties for conduct with more grave conduct and vice versa, so the legislature reasonably decided to treat those convicted of felony murder differently from those convicted of a different class 1 felony. The court also found it was reasonable for the legislature to create a different sentencing scheme for those convicted between 1990 and 2006 rather than just applying the current scheme to those individuals since the gap was created by the U.S. Supreme Court decisions. It was reasonable to create a different scheme for those individuals, because the individuals had already served a decade or more in prison and thus were in a unique position compared to a person convicted today.

    With these findings, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the juvenile sentencing provision adopted in S.B. 16-181 against claims it is special legislation.

     


    [1] A person commits felony murder by committing or attempting to commit arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault, or escape and in the course or furtherance of the crime or while in immediate flight therefrom the death of another person is caused. §18-3-102, C.R.S.

  • OLLS Adopts New Policy for Handling Duplicate Bill Requests from Members

    by Richard Sweetman

    Duplicate bill requests occur every session, and the Office of Legislative Legal Services (OLLS) must handle each such scenario with diplomacy, tact, and confidentiality. Beginning with the 2019 session, the OLLS is taking a new approach to handle instances in which more than one legislator requests the same bill.

    If an OLLS staff member determines that two bill requests are identical, nearly identical, or partial duplicates, the assigned drafter will do the following:

    • First, determine whether the requests are identical, nearly identical, or partial duplicates or merely similar.
    • If the drafter determines the two bill requests are merely similar, the drafter will continue drafting both requests without divulging any information to the requesting legislators regarding the existence of the two bill requests.
    • If the bills are identical, nearly identical, or partial duplicates, the drafter will contact each requesting legislator and inform him or her that the OLLS believes his or her request may be a duplicate of another bill request that has been filed with the OLLS. In this conversation, the drafter may disclose whether the other requestor is from the Senate or the House of Representatives and whether the requestor is a member of the same party.
    • The drafter will ask each requesting legislator for permission to disclose his or her identity to the other legislator who requested the bill. Note that the drafter is seeking the same permission from both legislators, and one legislator might give permission for such disclosure while the other legislator might not. If neither legislator gives permission to contact the other legislator, and both legislators indicate that they wish to continue with their bill requests, the drafter will continue to work on both requests without divulging any more information to either legislator about the other legislator’s request.
    • If either legislator directs the drafter to disclose his or her identity to the other legislator, the drafter will do so. Once the disclosure is made, the drafter will leave it up to the legislators to determine how to resolve the duplicate bill situation. The drafter’s goal is to let the two legislators decide what they want to do without assuming the role of an intermediary.

    In resolving a duplicate-bill-request situation, legislators may want to join efforts as prime sponsors in each house, or they may want to become joint prime sponsors in the same house, or one may become a prime sponsor and the other a sponsor, or one of them may kill his or her request. In some cases, both legislators will proceed with their bills and let the issue work itself out through the process.

    Note that a drafter may need to modify the process in the case of a partial duplicate bill request. A partial duplicate occurs when one requested bill contains a duplicate portion of another requested bill. In this case, the drafter must not disclose the other contents of a bill that is only a partial duplicate. The bill sponsors may choose to work out which bill will contain the duplicate provision or choose to include it in both bills.

    Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether two bill requests are truly duplicates. When in doubt, the OLLS will err on the side of caution by identifying a potential duplicate situation to the legislators who requested the bills.

    If legislators have any questions about the new OLLS policy, they should contact the office and ask to speak to an attorney.

  • Happy Thanksgiving

    Happy Thanksgiving from the Office of Legislative Legal Services

     

  • Interim Committee Recommends Changes to the Legislative Workplace Harassment Policy and Joint Rules

    by Jerry Barry and Megan Waples

    Last spring, in approving the study topics for the 2018 interim, the Legislative Council approved an interim committee to evaluate the findings and recommendations from the 2018 Legislative Workplace Study  requested by the Executive Committee in December of 2017. Speaker of the House Crisanta Duran chaired the committee, and Senator Beth Martinez Humenik was the vice chair. The other persons appointed to the committee were Senator Bob Gardner, Senator Dominick Moreno, Representative Kim Ransom, and Representative Faith Winter. The committee met five times over the course of the 2018 interim.

    The primary charge of the Legislative Workplace Interim Study Committee (Study Committee) was to make recommendations to the Executive Committee of the Legislative Council (Executive Committee) regarding the legislative workplace. Specifically, the Study Committee considered changes to the workplace harassment policy set forth in Rule 38 of the Joint Rules of the Senate and House of Representatives, the General Assembly’s workplace harassment policies, and the legislative human resources staffing and structure and looked at ways to promote cultural change regarding harassment in the workplace. Through the five meetings, the Study Committee heard testimony from experts in human resources, workplace harassment, and workplace culture and developed recommendations on each of these issues. Some recommendations were approved unanimously. In other areas, the Study Committee included alternative recommendations for the Executive Committee to consider.

    The Study Committee unanimously recommended that an Office of Legislative Workplace Relations (new office), consisting of at least two full-time employees, be established in the Office of Legislative Legal Services. The Study Committee recommended that the new office have locations in both the State Capitol Building and in the Legislative Office Building at 1525 Sherman Street and that the offices have doors opening directly into a public hallway to help maintain the privacy of individuals entering the offices.

    The Study Committee also recommended that Joint Rule 38 be amended to require the new office to recommend to the Executive Committee for its adoption a new Workplace Harassment Policy. The Study Committee recommended that the new Workplace Harassment Policy include:

    • A new anonymous reporting tool, although one member objected to any anonymous complaints;
    • A requirement that employees of the new office receive complaints under the policy;
    • An informal complaint resolution process, with a goal of resolving informal complaints within 30 days after the parties agree to the informal process;
    • A formal complaint resolution process that includes different paths depending on who the complaint is against;
    • Provisions maintaining confidentiality for parties and witnesses; and
    • Measures to prevent retaliation against persons involved in an investigation.

    The members of the Study Committee proposed different structures for overseeing formal complaints against legislators and partisan staff. Some members recommended a joint committee composed of four legislators—one from each caucus—and three non-legislators. The non-legislative members would be appointed jointly by the leaders of each caucus and would have experience in human resources, victim advocacy, and employment law. Other members recommended establishing separate workplace harassment committees for each chamber consisting of three members from each caucus of the chamber. The committees would include only legislators and could solicit testimony from experts as needed.

    The Study Committee made recommendations to amend the Colorado Open Records Act to protect documents related to complaints under the policy and recommended changes to the Open Meetings Law to protect the deliberations of the new workplace harassment committee or committees.

    The Study Committee also recommended that the amended Joint Rule 38 direct the new office to develop a Workplace Expectations Policy, which would establish general expectations for a respectful workplace and address complaints related to those expectations. Complaints under this policy would be resolved through an informal complaint process similar to that included in the proposed new Workplace Harassment Policy.

    In addition to the new policies, the Study Committee recommended adoption of an interim policy, which would incorporate into the existing workplace policy all recommendations that could be added without making changes to Joint Rule 38. These changes include requiring contacts to alert the human resources administrator to any complaints, allowing the human resources administrator to consult on issues related to workplace harassment, strengthening the anti-retaliation provisions, and clarifying record-keeping obligations.

    The Study Committee adopted a report of its recommendations at its final meeting on October 11, 2018. The Executive Committee met on November 8, 2018, and unanimously adopted only the interim policy. The remaining recommendations, which require legislative action through resolutions or bills, will be submitted for consideration by the Executive Committee that consists of the new legislative leadership chosen by the caucuses after the 2018 election. The full report of the Study Committee, including the new interim policy, is available to the public on the Study Committee’s website.

  • Throwback Thursday: Colorado’s 1918 Election

    by Patti Dahlberg

    By November 1918, Europe had been at war for four years, the United States had been involved for a little over a year, and Colorado was benefiting from increased wartime demand for agricultural and mining goods. Coal production reached a new high of 12,500,000 tons, and new fields were plowed to produce more wheat. The state industriously mined molybdenum and tungsten, both needed to make high-grade steel armaments for the troops. The Climax mine in Lake and Summit counties was the nation’s greatest source of molybdenum.

    Although mining and wheat production dominated Colorado’s economy during the war years, some local manufacturing of steel—in Pueblo—and agricultural products such as sugar beets, alfalfa, livestock, and other grains had begun to take hold. Railroads provided access for Colorado products to markets across the country and even helped an emerging tourism industry. Still there was the war, and in spite of high mining and agricultural production, Colorado like the rest of the country, experienced rising food and fuel prices and supply limits on sugar and wheat. Across the state, Coloradans planted gardens to supplement food supply, with some towns turning playgrounds into gardens. Denver even created a city-owned coal company to try to curb rising coal prices.

    Photo courtesy of Denver Public Library Western History/Genealogy Dept.

    America’s involvement in World War I (WWI) officially began with its declaration of war on April 6, 1917. Coloradans stepped up through the purchase of Liberty Bonds to lend the U.S. government more than $150 million dollars to help finance the war and sent 42,000 of their citizens to serve in the military. Around 1,500 Coloradans volunteered for military service, and another 4,500 volunteer soldiers came from the recently federalized National Guard. But, as in the rest of the country, the volunteer numbers were not enough, and an additional 36,000 Coloradans were drafted to join the rest of the 2.3 million Americans drafted into military service. Colorado’s population had been just shy of 800,000 in the 1910 census.

    There was also the Spanish flu epidemic. The Denver Post first reported a death due to influenza on September 27, 1918. By early 1919, the flu epidemic had killed more than 7,700 people in our state, compared to 1,000 to 1,100 Coloradans who were killed in the war. Most likely, the disease originated in crowded military bases in the United States or France in early 1918. Because of the war, any reports of healthy young service men and women becoming sick and dying from the flu were kept secret. In May, Spain became the first country to report flu deaths and so became the disease’s namesake.

    Photo courtesy of Denver Public Library Western History/Genealogy Dept.

    In October, Denver quickly ordered schools, churches, and places of amusement closed. Within a couple of weeks, Denver’s Board of Health also banned all meetings indoors or out, social gatherings in homes, and public funerals. The flu spread across Colorado and hit many small towns hard. It’s estimated that 675,000 Americans died of the Spanish Flu. Worldwide, 50 million people or roughly 1 in 30 infected died from the deadly virus. The ensuing large number of claims against life insurance policies skyrocketed, causing many small businesses to go bankrupt and disrupting the economy even further.

    Soldiers returning from overseas found warm welcomes but scarce jobs as wartime demand for Colorado products started slowing down. The prices of food and other goods began to rise, but wages did not keep pace with the rising inflation.

    The 1918 elections

    As the country marched toward the Tuesday, November 5, 1918, mid-term elections, WWI appeared to be winding down and the deadly influenza pandemic was ramping up. Earlier in the year, national campaigns agreed to downplay partisan differences in order to present a unified political front to the world, but these agreements were unraveling. The social climate of the war and loyalty perceptions may have played a significant role in some election results. The two Colorado incumbent Congressmen who voted against the 1917 war declaration were defeated, playing a part in flipping Congress to a Republican majority.

    There were three ballot proposals initiated by the citizens of Colorado:

    • Bone dry prohibition law. Colorado actually became a “dry” state—no alcohol allowed—in 1916, three years before the 18th Amendment to the United States Constitution regarding prohibition was ratified. In 1918, this initiated measure proposed to take prohibition a step further by closing certain loopholes that allowed liquor to be used for medicinal or religious purposes. Prohibitionists were successful in tying support for the additional restrictions to patriotism by condemning the use of the country’s precious grain supplies for the manufacture of alcohol instead of for the war effort. The statutory amendment passed 63% to 36%.
    • Placing state civil service in the Constitution. Colorado enacted its civil service laws and established a civil services commission in statute in 1907. This initiated measure amended the civil service laws and moved them to the state Constitution. The constitutional amendment passed 64% to 35%.
    • Relief of adult blind. This initiated measure established a blind benefit commission and a means to provide financial support for needy adults certified as blind. The statutory proposal passed 93% to 6%.

    Also, the General Assembly referred two Constitutional amendments to the people for approval:

    On the Monday following the election, November 11, 1918, the warring powers signed an armistice treaty to end the fighting in WWI. That morning, Denver health officials lifted the public meeting bans due to the deadly flu epidemic while thousands jammed downtown streets in celebration of Armistice Day. That evening, more than 8,000 people gathered in the municipal auditorium to sing together and listen to speeches. Movie and live theaters reopened that night to huge crowds. Eleven days later, 18 more flu sufferers died and public meetings, religious services, and private parties were once again banned, theaters were closed, and new rules now required people wear gauze masks while shopping.

    The Twenty-second Session of the Colorado General Assembly convened at noon on Wednesday, January 1, 1919, to a state in mourning, preparing to care for sick and injured returning soldiers and ready to address lingering public health concerns, increase employment, strengthen the state economy, and pay its debts.