by Julie Pelegrin

Before 2010, a teacher who was employed by a Colorado school district for three consecutive years automatically earned the status of nonprobationary teacher, which means the teacher could be dismissed only for certain reasons specified in statute and only after receiving notice and a hearing. With changes made to the law in 2010 by Senate Bill 10-191 (S.B. 191), a nonprobationary teacher can now be placed on indefinite unpaid leave for certain specified reasons – but the statute doesn’t require notice and a hearing. How is indefinite unpaid leave different from being dismissed? The Colorado Court of Appeals recently considered that question.

S.B. 191, which mainly focuses on evaluations for teachers and principals, also includes language about teacher employment. Specifically, the act amends §22-63-202, C.R.S., to say that a teacher cannot be placed at a school unless the school principal agrees to the placement after getting input from at least two of the school’s teachers. This requirement is commonly known as the “mutual consent” provision.

S.B.191 also allows a school district to remove a nonprobationary teacher from the classroom for certain specified reasons. The nonprobationary teacher can apply for a vacant position at a different school, but the mutual consent provision applies. If the nonprobationary teacher cannot secure a mutual consent placement within the longer of 12 months or two hiring cycles, the teacher goes on indefinite unpaid leave. After that, if the teacher secures a mutual consent placement, the school district will resume the teacher’s salary and benefits at the level they would have been if the teacher had not been on unpaid leave.

In January of 2014, the Denver Classroom Teachers Association (DCTA) and five nonprobationary teachers employed by Denver Public Schools (DPS) filed a lawsuit against DPS and the State Board of Education claiming that placing a nonprobationary teacher on unpaid leave as allowed in S.B.191 is unconstitutional. All but one of the nonprobationary teachers were removed from their schools under the S.B.191 provisions. Three of the five teachers were placed on indefinite unpaid leave after being unable to secure mutual consent placements.

The suit makes two claims:

1. The teacher employment statute creates a private contract between the teachers and the school district; the unpaid leave provisions unconstitutionally interfere with that contract; and
2. The teacher employment statute creates a property interest in continued employment for nonprobationary teachers. Placing a nonprobationary teacher on indefinite unpaid leave is essentially the same as dismissing the teacher. So, the provisions that allow the school district to place the teacher on indefinite unpaid leave without giving the teacher due process – notice and a hearing – take away the teacher’s property interest in continued employment in violation of the due process clause of the constitution.

Last March, the state Attorney General and the lawyers for DPS filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the basis that the teachers and the DCTA did not state any claims for which the court could grant relief. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss in June.

The teachers and the DCTA appealed the trial court’s dismissal order to the Colorado Court of Appeals. And in November, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

On the first claim, the trial court recognized that there is a presumption that a statute does not create private contract rights; a statute creates policy that the General Assembly can later change. A person can overcome that presumption by showing that, in passing a statute, the General Assembly actually intended to create private contract rights. But the trial court did not think the teachers and the DCTA had provided any evidence that the General Assembly intended to do that when it passed the teacher employment statutes.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court. The Court of Appeals looked not just at the current teacher employment law, but at the previous law as well. The Court of Appeals opined that the current teacher employment law is not significantly different from the previous law: The previous law granted a teacher “tenure” after three years of continuous employment and the current law grants a teacher “nonprobationary status” after three years of continuous employment. In the opinion of the Court, “tenure” and “nonprobationary status” are synonymous because they both guarantee dismissal only for cause and only after notice and a hearing.

There is Colorado case law that holds that the previous teacher employment law created private contract rights. Based on this, the Court of Appeals found that the teachers and DCTA have overcome the presumption against creating contracts, and the current teacher employment statute does create a contract between teachers and the school district. Now the trial court must decide whether the S.B.191 provisions substantially impair the contractual relationship and whether the impairment is justified because it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.

The Court of Appeals also disagreed with the trial court on the second claim: The S.B.191 provisions that allow a school district to place a nonprobationary teacher on indefinite unpaid leave do violate constitutional due process requirements. The trial court had said that being on indefinite unpaid leave is not the same as being fired; the S.B.191 provisions simply change the rights that accompany employment, they don’t take the right to continued employment away.

The Court of Appeals agreed that, since a person can come back from indefinite unpaid leave at the same salary level, being on indefinite unpaid leave is not the same as being fired. So the teachers who were placed on indefinite unpaid leave were not deprived of the property right of continued employment. But, the Court found that when a teacher is placed on unpaid leave, the teacher’s expectation of continued employment is “disappointed” because the teacher is not working or getting paid. A Colorado Supreme Court case interpreting the previous teacher employment law held that a teacher who is placed on unpaid leave has a right to a hearing to decide whether the teacher was truly placed on unpaid leave for a reason authorized in the statute and whether the placement was made in an arbitrary or unreasonable fashion. Based on this case, placing the teachers on unpaid leave without a hearing, as allowed by the S.B.191 provisions, does deprive teachers of their constitutional due process rights.

On December 17, 2015, the Attorney General’s office and the attorneys for DPS filed a petition for certiorari, requesting the Colorado Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeals decision.

by Jery Payne

Some folks in Gilbert, Arizona, wanted to use signs to advertise upcoming events and posted these signs on private property. The town had rules limiting the size of event signs and the times they could be posted. These signs were up too long, so the town’s sign police busted the sign folks. The citizens became indignant and took the town to court. The case was appealed all the way to the United States Supreme Court, who held that the town’s rules violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because the town had stricter rules for event signs than for other signs.

The court reasoned that the sign police had to read the sign to know it was an event sign, so the rules were “content” based — that is, the rules were based on what the signs said. Although the town never intended to discriminate against a viewpoint and merely regulated the signs, these rules were unconstitutional.

Some other folks in Texas wanted to use license plates to advertise their group and put these plates on their private vehicles. The state had rules requiring special license plates to be approved by a state board. The license plate police decided it didn’t like the message portrayed on the plates, so it did not approve them. The citizens became indignant and took the state to court. The case was appealed all the way to the United States Supreme Court, who held that these rules didn’t violate the First Amendment.

The Court reasoned that it was okay for the license plate police to discriminate based on a viewpoint because they intended to control the content — that is, the license plate police made decisions based on what the plates said.

How do we harmonize these two decisions? They were handed down by the same court in the same session. In the Gilbert case, the Court explained that a government “has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” In the Texas case, the court explained that Texas may discriminate based on viewpoint because “Texas maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates.” Isn’t this a contradiction?

In a part of the opinion that consoles Gilbert for losing the case, the Court explains that “on public property, the Town may go a long way towards entirely forbidding the posting of signs, so long as it does so in an evenhanded, content-neutral manner.” But if Gilbert can’t even control content on public property, why can Texas control content on license plates affixed to private vehicles?

The difference between these polar-opposite decisions is the notion that license plates are government speech and that the government may enter the public forum and advocate for its ideals. In which case, the Court held it shouldn’t be hampered by not being able to take sides.

Some of you may be wondering how a private group trying to get a license plate results in government speech. Who is really advocating under these circumstances—the private group or the government? Among the special license plates are these slogans:

• Get it Sold with RE/MAX
• I’d Rather Be Golfing
• University of Oklahoma

The dissent pointed out it seemed a little strange to argue that the State of Texas had decided that RE/MAX was their realtor of choice or that it’s better to be golfing than working or even playing football. Speaking of football, it may be well-nigh treason in the Lone Star State to endorse the University of Oklahoma given its deep rivalry with the University of Texas. To the dissent, special license plates display the speech of the car owners who choose them, not of Texas.

The majority, however, believed that the messages on license plates are different than other speech, because putting a message on a license plate implies that the state endorses it: “[A] person who displays a message on a Texas license plate likely intends to convey to the public that the state endorsed the message. If not, the individual could simply display the message in question in larger letters on a bumper sticker right next to the plate.” Although the speech itself originates from citizens, putting it on a license plate implies that the government endorses it.

It’s not often that the Supreme Court decides cases based on factual distinctions. And given that they don’t find facts, it’s even rarer that the Court would overturn two lower decisions based on the facts. But I don’t see how else you can understand this decision. The facts of this case are in a grey area; special license plates may be reasonably seen both as private speech and government speech. So a line had to be drawn, and the Court drew it just this side of license plates because license plates are issued by the government. And people may think the government is endorsing the message on the plate.

by Julie Pelegrin

This week, the Colorado Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Dwyer v. State of Colorado, holding that the negative factor, which is applied in calculating funding for school districts, does not violate section 17 of article IX of the Colorado constitution – commonly referred to as Amendment 23. Reviewing the Dwyer opinion presents an excellent opportunity to observe some of the presumptions and rules of statutory and constitutional interpretation in action.

Facts and Issue
For a discussion of the facts and issues in the Dwyer case, see this LegiSource article posted last April. For now, suffice it to say that in 2010, the General Assembly created the negative factor, which reduces school district funding to ensure that the state’s funding responsibility for public P-12 education doesn’t exceed the state’s available resources. In 2014, a group of parents, school districts, and education organizations sued the state claiming that the negative factor violates Amendment 23 which requires annual minimum increases to “the statewide base per pupil funding, as defined by the Public School Finance Act of 1994, article 54 of title 22, Colorado Revised Statutes….”

The persons suing the state – we’ll call them the parents – claimed that the negative factor that the state imposes violates Amendment 23 because, when the amendment refers to “statewide base per pupil funding,” it really means the total funding for public education. When Amendment 23 passed, applying the formula to a higher base automatically resulted in an increase in the total funding. So that’s what the voters must have intended. With the negative factor, however, even though the base increases by inflation, the amount of overall funding for public education does not increase by inflation.

The state argued that it has fully complied with the requirements of Amendment 23. When the amendment refers to “statewide base per pupil funding,” that’s what it means. And the state has increased the statewide base per pupil funding by at least the required amount every year since Amendment 23 passed.

Chief Justice Nancy Rice, writing for the Court, summed up the issue like this:

Legally speaking…Plaintiffs’ challenge to the negative factor presents a surprisingly straightforward question of constitutional interpretation. Quite simply, this case is about one thing: the meaning of the term “base.”

Statutes presumed constitutional: §2-4-201, C.R.S.
The opinion starts with the bedrock presumption that the statute that creates the negative factor is constitutional, and a person who claims otherwise must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Avid LegiSource followers may recall our discussion of the presumption of constitutionality in an article published earlier this summer.

Plain meaning rule
The Court then moved straight to the most commonly applied rule of statutory construction: The plain meaning rule.

As explained in a previous LegiSource article, the plain meaning rule says that a court must give words their ordinary and popular meaning, and if the language of a statute – or in this case a constitutional provision – is clear and unambiguous, then it must be enforced as written. The Court also recognized that, just as legislators are presumed to know the current state of the law when they vote to change it, voters who vote for an initiative “are presumed to know the existing law at the time they amend or clarify that law.”

The Court then held that Amendment 23 requires increases only “to statewide base per pupil funding, not total per pupil funding. We know that this is what Amendment 23 means, because this is exactly what Amendment 23 says.” (Emphasis in the original). Having found that Amendment 23 very clearly and intentionally uses the phrase “statewide base per pupil funding,” as defined by the Public School Finance Act of 1994, the Court refused to consider whether the voters actually intended to require annual increases to total funding for public education, deciding that “[i]f voters had wished to increase ‘total’ per pupil funding rather than ‘base’ per pupil funding, they would have said so.”

The parents argued that the explanation of Amendment 23 in the 2000 Blue Book – the explanation of ballot measures prepared for voters by the Legislative Council – suggests that voters intended to ensure an annual increase in the total funding for public education. But the Court said that “only where the amendment’s language ‘is susceptible to multiple interpretations’ do we look beyond it to ascertain the voters’ intent.” Since the Court found that the language can be interpreted only one way, it did not consider any evidence of voter intent.

In the alternative, the parents argued that the state has not in reality increased the statewide base per pupil funding amount as required by the plain meaning of Amendment 23. The parents claimed that the actual dollar amount set in statute for statewide base per pupil funding is meaningless because the negative factor actually reduces the statewide base per pupil funding. The parents provided a complicated mathematical demonstration to support their argument. But, the Court found the mathematical argument to be a “red herring,” holding that “the result of the reduction – that is, whether the State has reduced any district’s per pupil funding below the base level set by Amendment 23 – is all that matters.” (Emphasis in original). And the undisputed facts show that, in each year since the General Assembly created the negative factor, each school district received a per pupil amount that was greater than the statewide base per pupil funding amount set for that year.

Court must avoid an interpretation that has an absurd result
The parents also raised another standard rule of constitutional interpretation: Implementation of a constitutional provision is intended to be just and reasonable, and an unjust, absurd, or unreasonable result should be avoided when construing a constitutional provision. The parents argued that interpreting Amendment 23 to require an increase in statewide base per pupil funding but to allow a decrease in total education funding produces an absurd result.

But the Court found that

…it was perfectly rational, not absurd, for voters to insist that the State annually increase base per pupil funding (which is uniform across all school districts) while simultaneously affording the General Assembly discretion to modify factor funding (which is specific to each individual district).

Conclusion: Still subject to interpretation?
Having applied the standard principles of constitutional interpretation and interpreted the term “statewide base per pupil funding” according to its plain and statutorily defined meaning, the Court held that “the negative factor has not reduced the base below its constitutional minimum and thus does not violate Amendment 23.” And reading the Court’s opinion suggests that the rules of statutory and constitutional interpretation are clear and easily applied.

But, remember, the Court’s holding was a 4-3 decision. Three of the justices who applied the rules of statutory and constitutional interpretation decided that the meaning of Amendment 23 was not all that plain and that the parents should be able to present their arguments at trial.

It appears that the rules of interpretation are subject to…interpretation.

Correction, Oct. 6, 2015: The headline of this article was changed for clarity.